The purpose of this research is to show and to analyze the problems that appeared after the Cyprus legislative change οn the 1 st January 2003 and mainly to point out the reactions of the shareholders of the off -shore companies, due to the changes of the tax legislation. Our theoretical model considers that a law in the Capital Market is effective, if it increases the expected social prosperity. In our analysis we examined the Bayesian model approach of the effectiveness of the law whose base was to analyze the data supports of the opinion from the asked company consultants.
Introduction
According to fundamental economic principle, states institute laws in order to improve society's affluence (Besley, 2006) . Consequently a law is effective if it achieves this goal (Karagiorgos, 2003) . The Cyprian legislation's institution of offshore companies had without dispute been the most beneficiary for the country. Specifically, Cyprus has introduced the estate of "offshore business" (Giles, 2004) so as to promote the country as an international business hub. The term «offshore business» refers to juridical persons whose beneficiary proprietors do not stay in Cyprus and their incomes proceed from activities out of the country. Moreover, were not allowed to offer products or services to Cyprus, either to resident population of the country or occasional. In addition, it was not allowed to these companies to act as intermediaries to trading of foreign products in Cyprus or to work on export of Cyprian products.
Till the end of December 2002 there had been totally registered more than 45,000 offshore companies with the purpose of management and control of enterprising activities out of Cyprus and about 11,800 shipping companies with the aim of registration ships under Cyprian flag (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2001) . 81% from these companies came from Europe and 9% from USA and Canada. It is remarked that more than 15,000 offshore companies completely acted in international market (Iliades, Pashalidis, Hatzianastasiou, 2003) . A part of 1,200 from those companies employed staff and had set up accomplished offices in Cyprus 4 .
The Cyprian income in foreign exchange from the offshore businesses during 2002 was important running up to 668 million euro and forming the 6.6 % of gross national product. In this amount, the contribution of shipping administration, which is estimated at 30% (Patsalides & Associates, 2003) , was significant.
Tax Reform in Cyprus
Since 1/1/2003 and after the Cyprian tax reform in July 2002, legislative system changed as far as it concerns offshore business; especially ring fencing for activities only out of Cyprus, which was applied to offshore companies, was revoked ( (Patsalides & Associates, 2003) . It is remarked that the new tax system is entirely conformed to directions and guidelines of European Union and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2003) . 4 Thessaloniki Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 18 June 2004 International Journal of Economics & Business Administration, I (3), 2013 T. Specifically 5 :
 There is no difference between offshore business and home companies and further more the entry of Cyprian companies to the first category is permitted. Offshore business can be registered in Cyprus in any of the following types:
  Compensation of losses among companies of the same business group is allowed (in case of dependence higher of 75%). Also the limitation of losses' transfer for only 5 years is revoked.  Profits which come from sale of real property out of Cyprus releases from taxation.  The possession of shares by succession in Cyprian offshore company is not burdened with succession duties.  Reorganizations, mergers and acquisitions of companies are revoked from taxation. It is important to notice that the tax reform was viewed necessary by Cyprian Government so as to conform the legislation to the Common vested, to achieve compliance with the Code of Ethics about companies' taxation and to effectuate the obligations to OECD. As far as it concerns other details about companies, we have to comment the following:
 The stock of companies has to be divided at least to one (1) share and to be one standard shareholder who can be natural entity, company or trust 6 (Antoine, 2005) . The shares can be held by trustees for account of beneficiary shareholders.
Tax Reform's Impacts on Cyprian Offshore Companies
As it is referred above, since 1975, when Cyprus initiated the estate of offshore companies (Giles, 2004) for first time (Tornaritis, 1984) , until 1/1/2003 when the legislation about offshore activities changed, there were 45,000 offshore companies in action.
The most important change was the increase of profits' tax rate from 4.25% to 10% which remains the same both for the taxation of incomes from commercial activities in and out of the country.
A research was carried out by Melas, during his doctoral thesis (Melas, 2008) , in order to show probable change in offshore companies' behavior, which acted until then in Cyprus, and also the activity of new international business after the tax reform. 6 A trust is begun by someone who is called "trust-giver" and is a mode whereby property ("trustproperty") is held by one or more people ("trustees") for account somebody or for beneficiaries or for specific purposes. Even if trustees are the proprietors of trust-property, they cannot administer it as absolute owners due to the fact that they have the obligation to conform to the terms of law and the trust's report. The property of trust can consists of any kind of asset everywhere in the world. (definition by PriceWaterhouseCoopers -Cyprus as a financial centerthe connection with Greece)
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The purpose of this research is to highlight and elaborate the problems of tax reform and mainly the shareholders' responses of offshore companies due to change of tax system, transactions' secrecy and confidence among natural persons.
It is obvious that due to extremely big amount of offshore companies which act in Cyprus with Greek interests, the responses have repercussions on Greek economy with relation to reforms of law 3091/2002 7 in our country which was initiated in an effort to measure tax evasion and tax avoidance (Melas, 1997 ) that occurred through offshore companies. The research was conducted through interviews by the use of questionnaires, took apart thirteen consultant's offices that represent 6,068 offshore and international Cyprian companies.
Briefly the results of research are appeared as follows: 
Statistical Analysis of Cyprian Law's Effectiveness

The theoretical model
Let's assume that in capital market are joined n consultants' offices and that each and every one represents a number of offshore companies. Portfolio management depends on degrees of integration as has been pointed out by Thalassinos and Kiriazidis (2003) .
The profit of each office is expressed by a function u, which depends positively on the number of offshore companies it represents. In other words u i (h i ) where h i is the number of companies that the office represents and i = 1, …, n. Let for assume convenience that u i = h i.
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The variable h is random with probability density function φ(h), cumulative distribution function Φ(h) and values h i є R + . (David, 2008) .
As we understand from the model, the existence of offshore companies offers economic benefit to the host country. Specially, it is considered that as the number of offshore companies is increased, the total economic profit is increased too. It is also assumed that the government cares about society's affluence; this means that economic distribution through which all consultants' offices represent a number of off shore companies is preferred to another distribution according to which consultant offices represent any other company. So, society's affluence is expresses by function
It is assumed that government initiates laws in order to improve society's welfare. Thereby, if a law's enforcement in capital market influences the contribution of companies then the law is (economically) efficient as it achieves his goal. Let φ(h) and φ'(h) be the contributions of offshore companies before and after the enforcement of a law in the market.
Further, is given the definition of law's efficiency and an empirical method to examine and verify it is introduced. Definition: A law in capital market is called «efficient» if increases the expected affluence of society. Moreover the law is effective if the following formula s in force:
Proposition: If the following conditions (i) and (ii) are in effect then the law is efficient.
The conditions (i) and (ii) show that for each value of h the area of cumulative distribution Φ΄ is smaller than distribution of Φ. In other words Φ has bigger dispersion than Φ΄. So it can be said that the conditions (i) and (ii) show that contribution φ has higher cusps than φ΄.
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It is familiar that function Ω has maximum to the point where Ω (h) = 0 and it is reached when h 1 = h 2 = h n . This means that function of society's affluence is increased through the decrease of the contribution's Φ variability.
So, from conditions (i) and (ii) we conclude that average welfare of society increases as variability increases, ceteris paribus and so:
The proposition postulates that if average of contributions remains the same then law's effectiveness depends on the decrease of dispersion. Of course, if dispersion remains invariable, then the existence of effectiveness leads to increase of the distribution's average.
In other words the proposition shows that effectiveness of law depends on the comparison of companies' contributions before and after its enforcement.
Consequently the efficiency of law can be examined empirically through the assessment of contributions' parameters from which observations are derived.
The empirical results
The variables which are used are:  LYP = the logarithm of the population of offshore companies for each office before law's enforcement.  LY1 = the logarithm of the population of offshore companies for each office that did not became Cyprian after law's enforcement.  LY2 = the logarithm of the population of offshore companies for each office that did not change country after law's enforcement.  LY = the logarithm of the population of offshore companies for each office that neither became Cyprian nor changed country after law's enforcement.  Initially the sample of each variable was examined so as to find from which population comes.
The test of data's adaptiveness in theoretical distributions is done by the use of statistics Χ 2 . The results are in the Table 1 . Using significance level 10% (α = 0.1), it is founded that null hypothesis is in effect only for Weibull contribution. So the empirical data leads to the conclusion that each variable follows Weibull contribution.
The probability density function of Weibull contribution is:
Where, α, β > 0 are parameters of contributions.
Also the cumulative probability function is: 1 Table 2 . From the results of the above table it is clear that the following in equation is applied:
, which shows the effectiveness of law. So the results appear that in any way law is ineffective.
Assessment of linear model
Let's assumed that h' is random variable which shows the contribution of offshore companies at consultants' offices after law's enforcement (Pierce D.A. and Schaefer D. W., 1986) .
It is assumed also that values Χ of random variable h, before law's implementation, are connected with values Y of variable h' through the type: Y = αΧ β ε where ε is random variable with logarithmnormal distribution and α, are parameters of that. Using logarithm the type becomes:
log Y = log α + β log X + log ε or y = c + βx +e
where, y :=log Y, x :=log X, c:= log α and e :=log ε.
If the law has no influence there are no differences between the values of h' and h.
In this case α = 1 and β = 1 are true.This means empirically that at test of hypothesis c = 0 and β = 1 in linear model (1).
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The value of statistic t is in brackets, σ is the regression standard error and r is correlation coefficient. It is clear that inclination of linear model is statistically significant in contrast with invariable average which in any way was important.
Next, proof of hypothesis is done:
The values of test X 2 values of probability and degrees of freedom are showed in Table 5 . The values of test F, the degrees of freedom and the probability's values that comes from regression's residues and the method bootstrapping, are appeared in Table 6 . 
M 
So as to find a model that explains efficiently empirical data, the model which minimized the sum squares of (studentized) residuals, was chosen. The models are showed in Table 7 . We understand, from the table, the solidity of linear model which was used and this enhances the conclusions of linear model's estimation.
Bayesian study of law's influence
Using Bayes' regression helps to involve previous information about rates' values to the results of normal regression. Specially, if there is prior information about these values, it can be used to improve posterior estimates.
The model (1) was estimated by Bayes' regression and two basic conditions of prior information. Especially, in the first case, it is assumed that information is diffused because it does not offer essential contribution to specific coefficients' values (diffuse priors). In contrast with this case, in the second one it is assumed that there is essential information which is referred to specific coefficients' values of model (informative priors). The procession of model's (1) estimation and its statistical properties are presented thoroughly by Zellner A. (1971) . According to Table 9 , Bayes' estimation of model (1) without specific prior information, does not differentiate found values of c and β in relation with classical least squares regression. (see Table 4 ).
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The Paradox of Cyprian 63 Table 10 shows the 95% (posterior) of confidence interval of c and β. As it is appeared in this table, these confidence intervals leads to acceptance of hypothesis c = 0 and β = 1. Because of the fact that the model (1) coefficients' estimations do not show improvement in comparison with classical regression, next they are estimated by the use of information about their probable values. So the initial perception of coefficients' values is included in the process of estimation by the use of contribution function that was assumed previously.
Consequently, Bayes' regression by informative priors is done with the assumption that coefficients c and β follow the normal distribution with averages 0 and 1. The estimations of coefficients that are based on that information are sowed in Table 11 . So it is clear that posterior estimations improved the view of coefficients. Especially value of coefficient c was decreased and β was increased in relation with previous estimators. Also statistical significance of β was improved whether no-significance of co-efficient c was enhanced more. 
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T. The same conclusions come from Table 12 which shows the percentage of 95% (posterior) confidence interval of each coefficient. The estimation of intervals is more accurate as their range is closer than the range of Table's 10 intervals. So the conclusion is that use of Bayes' regression by informative priors led to improvement of estimators' accuracy and enhanced the hypothesis of null average and one point inclination of model (1). Further use of Bayesian regression's results was done to test the hypothesis of law's no-influence (e.g. c = 0 and β = 1) through test F. 
Trust and law's influence
This paragraph deals with the factors which influence the number of set trusts. Using Probit analysis it is tested whether the number of trusts is influenced by commercial factors or / and tax-evasion causes. In order to estimate model, variable I is used, which gets values 0 and 1 if observation's value about set trusts is lower or higher than median respectively. This means that variable I divide the observations to two categories: one with small number of trusts, which has value 0, and the second one which has large number of trusts and value 1. The Probit estimated model is: I = βX where X is independent variable, namely the commercial or tax-evasion factors. The results of Probit regression are appeared in Table 14 .
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Next it is researched whether offshore companies' actions differentiate accordingly to population of set trusts; so according to tax-evasion incentives.
For this purpose model (1) was estimated, without constant term, by least squares method:
Estimation of coefficient β (model 2) appears in Table 15 . It is clear from regression results that all estimations of β are statistical significant with values close to one point. Furthermore the estimations of correlation coefficients and regression's standard error are not different from the estimations of model (1). (26, 4) Consequently, empirical conclusions proved the hypothesis of null constant term and one point inclination for model (1); this enhances the conclusions of previous paragraphs about law's no-influence.
The invariability of coefficient β was made by Chow test, whereby observations where divided in two subgroups according to variable I. So, null hypothesis stage that its value is same for all samples. In other words coefficient's value remains same (invariable) in both subgroups. The acceptance of null hypothesis means that offshore companies with many trusts behave in the same way with the companies which have small population of trusts.
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The results of variable's β test constancy are showed in Table 16 . Using level of significance 10% it is concluded that test is important for all the variables except for LY2. This means that null variable becomes accepted only by the observation which concern variable LY2. So empirical results lead to the conclusion that coefficient β is not constant for the variables LY1 and LY2. In other words it seems that companies' behavior differ accordingly to the population of trusts. In order to test the solidity of coefficient β it was tried to find specific (no-linear) models which explain more efficiently the data of both models. The fitting of model in any sample was achieved based on minimization of least squares sum (studentized) residuals.
Models' estimations, standard error and correlation coefficient are showed in Table  17 . From this table it seems that each model fits well to empirical data. Next derivation of each function was counted to the point which is equal to the average of extrinsic variable. In other words we tried to search whether the average change of variable x has the same influence on internal variable y without regard to sample. Table 18 appears the variable's x estimated changes at their average value as they are counted by each sample. From table 18 we see that external variable's influence on internal one is different for LY1 and LY whether is almost the same for LY2. The conclusions of Table 18 agree with Table' s 16 results about constancy's test of linear regression variable. So it seems again that companies' behavior with many trusts is not the same with those which have low population of trusts. 
Conclusions
1. Law is (financially) ineffective.
2. There is positive correlation between trust and tax evasion. Especially tax evasion factors lead to high number of trusts. 3. Companies' (consultant offices) behavior with small quantity of trusts seems to be different from the behavior of companies with many trusts. 4. The behavior of companies (consultant offices) with different trust quantity appears to differ before and after law's enforcement. Especially low number trust companies do not change. In contrast with these companies, high number trust companies change their actions. This leads to the conclusion that law probably has influence on companies whose incentive is tax evasion. 5. Translocation of an offshore company in another country is a decision does not seem to be influenced by law's enforcement or by tax evasion factors (it is due to other reasons). On the contrary to this, tax-evasion reasons influenced the decision to turn a company into a Cyprian one.
